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Abstract 
Entre los muchos problemas que plantea la globalización, es particularmente 
relevante el de la justicia civil, dado que la circulación global de las relaciones 
jurídicas hace necesario pensar en una tutela supranacional del derecho. Se trata 
de establecer qué derechos van a ser efectivamente tutelados, en favor de qué 
sujetos y con qué método. El arbitraje internacional sirve sólo para los ricos, 
mientras que la mediación encuentra muchos límites y no es una solución válida 
en todos los casos. Excluida la hipótesis de un único código procesal mundial, es 
necesario pensar en una adecuada armonización de la disciplina procesal nacional. 
 
1. Introduction 
The label “globalization” has become so “loose and possibly rhetorical”1 
and has acquired so many meanings that any attempt to define its contents 
would be meaningless. Yet, multifaceted and ambiguous as it is, the real 
phenomenon is under our eyes more every day, and therefore more every day it 
makes sense to analyze it trying at least to identify some of the effects that it 
provokes on the administration of justice all around the world. If we assume 
that the law in general, or at least many areas of the law—if not all—have been, 
are being or will soon be globalized, then it is meaningful to discuss a topic 
dealing with the “globalization of procedural justice”. It is not enough, 
however, to introduce such a label—that might also be loose and rhetorical—
without trying to deal with some of the most relevant issues that immediately 
arise from that label. 
 
2. Globalization of what? 
A first question that may be asked while talking of the globalization of 
procedural justice may be “globalization of what?”, referring to the areas of civil 
litigation that are more deeply and more frequently affected by the globalization 
of disputes and conflicts, i.e. those areas in which the “transnational” character 
                                                 
1 Vid. TWINING, Globalization and Legal Theory, Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, Ill., 2000, pág. 2. 
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of litigation is more frequent. In its general meaning, “transnational” refers to 
any kind of litigation arising among parties (private citizens, companies, nation 
states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, and so forth) that 
“belong” to different national jurisdictions2. One could say that any civil 
dispute about any matter could have this character, but such a statement—
although true—would not say much. More concretely, it is easy to consider that 
at least prima facie the areas in which transnational disputes are specially 
frequent, and then in which we could think of globalizing civil justice, are those 
of international commerce, of the fluxes of financial capital, and generally the 
world of “economy and business”. The evidence for this is the fact that in the 
last decades the so-called lex mercatoria has been considered as the real if not the 
only subject matter of globalization3. Correspondingly, one might be inclined to 
think that globalizing procedural justice means just globalizing the solution of 
disputes arising in the area covered by the lex mercatoria. 
Nobody could reasonably deny that this is by far the most important area 
in which globalization has occurred in the last decades and is developing at 
present, but this—although important—is only a part of the problem. The 
practical development of economies indicates several other areas of the law in 
which significant problems are arising insofar as the administration of justice at 
a transnational level is involved. Just to stress some of them, we could think of: 
a) labor disputes, becoming more and more transnational as a consequence of 
the outsourcing and the de-localization of industrial production, so that the 
employees working for the same employer (national or multinational) actually 
are located in different countries; b) environmental protection, which is clearly 
necessary at a global level due to the global dimension of pollution and mass 
disasters; c) intellectual property, as an effect of the global circulation of cultu-
ral products. And so forth.   
Moreover, besides such very important but specific subject matters it is 
worth stressing that an extremely significant aspect of cultural and legal 
globalization is the growing generalization of the sensitivity towards the 
recognition and the enforcement of fundamental rights at a supra-national level. 
This is an extremely relevant aspect of the complex phenomenon of judicial 
globalization4, i.e. of the trend that is growing in the practice of several supreme, 
constitutional and supra-national courts to make references to the case law and 
to the precedents of other national or international courts all around the world, 
mainly when the subject matter of their decision deals with the interpretation 
                                                 
2 For a systematic use of the word in this sense vid. e.g. ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational 
Civil Procedure, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge a.o., 2006. 
3 In the extremely broad literature about this topic vid. for instance GALGANO, La globalizzazione 
nello specchio del diritto, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2005, pag. 43; FERRARESE, Diritto sconfinato. Inventiva 
giuridica e spazi nel mondo globale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2006, pag. 76; TWINING, ibidem, pags. 51, 139.  
4 Vid. generally TARUFFO, Globalization, Processes of Judicial, in Enc. of Law & Society. American and 
Global Perspectives, David D. Clark ed., SAGE Publ., Los Angeles a.o., 2007, vol. 2, pag. 656. 
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and the implementation of fundamental rights. In such a practice these courts 
go far beyond the boundaries of national law and national jurisdictions and 
refer to what seems to be a “common—and hopefully global—core” of 
fundamental rights5.  
 
3. Globalization for whom? 
Trying to understand how globalization might affect the implementation of 
procedural justice, a further question may arise. It can be stated in these terms: 
“globalization of justice for whom?” Such a question seems to be meaningful 
for various reasons. On the one hand, it is well known that that powerful 
phenomenon of globalization that was the colonization of some continents of 
the world was made also through the forced imposition of legal models by the 
colonizers on the colonized, obviously in favor of the former with the aim of 
subordinating the latter. On the other hand, it seems clear that the current legal 
globalization is not a “neutral” or “equal” means oriented towards achieving a 
higher level of justice for all. Actually, there are some subjects that would take 
advantage from a globalized civil justice, and many other subjects that could be 
disadvantaged by it. A globalized civil justice may actually work, under the 
formal label and the appearance of the rule of law, in favor of “strong” parties, 
such as powerful countries, multinational companies, banks, commercial 
organizations, and so forth, since it may result in more efficient devices that 
could be used by the “strong” in order to exploit the “weak” (which could be 
small countries, individual debtors, private investors, workers, and so forth). As 
is well known, the globalization of financial markets is a very efficient means to 
export financial crises to weak countries and weak investors. In a similar way, 
the globalization of the labor market is a powerful way to exploit less protected 
workers (such as minors and women) all around the world. 
Even procedural devices that prima facie would seem able to protect the 
weak parties of commercial transactions may reveal their actual nature as 
double-edged weapons. Transnational efficient procedures for small claims are 
usually presented as a useful device for the protection of small creditors against 
big transnational debtors, but we should not forget that the same procedures 
may be used as efficient mechanisms for quick and inexpensive debt collection 
by big creditors (such as insurance companies, banks, commercial networks, 
and so forth) against thousands or millions of small debtors.        
Moreover, it seems worthy to take into account—notwithstanding the time 
which has passed—the fundamental analysis made in the Seventies by Marc 
                                                 
5 Vid. mainly MARKESINIS-FEDTKE, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration?, 
UCL Press, London, 2006; MARKESINIS-FEDTKE, Engaging with Foreign Law, Hart Publ., Oxford-
Portland, Ore., 2009, pag. 127; SLAUGHTER, Judicial Globalization, in 40 Va.J.Int’l. Law 1999–2000, 
pag. 1103. 
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Galanter about the strategic advantages of the “Haves” over the “Have-nots”6. 
Actually one may wonder whether any kind of procedural globalization would 
work in the sense of reducing the strategic, economic and cultural differences 
among “repeat players” and “one-shotters”. A first impression can be just in 
the opposite sense: at the global level “repeat players” are much bigger, more 
powerful and better organized than at the national level, while “one-shotters” 
tend to be relatively smaller, weaker and less able to take advantage of 
transnational or international procedural devices (which in many cases do not 
exist or are not available). It might be said, therefore, that globalization may 
work as a powerful “multiplier” of the differences among the parties, and 
correspondingly as a relevant factor of procedural inequality.     
Looking at the same problem from the standpoint of the weak and of the 
“Have-nots”, the most important aspect deals with the judicial implementation 
of fundamental rights. As abovesaid, such rights tend to be recognized at a 
global level, and then their implementation cannot be intended only as a 
“domestic” problem within the borders of single nation-states. 
As Luigi Ferrajoli writes, jurisdiction is the fundamental guarantee of all 
rights, but specially of the fundamental ones that are specially important for the 
weakest subjects: no right—and no fundamental right—actually exists if it 
cannot be vindicated and protected by jurisdictional means7.  
This entails at least two consequences that should be taken into conside-
ration in a global perspective. First: fundamental rights—as well as all rights—
should be interpreted and implemented on a bases of equality: so to say, any 
citizen of the world is entitled to be treated as equal to any other, mainly when 
he or she is economically, socially or culturally weak. From this point of view, 
the globalization of procedural justice might be considered as a powerful factor 
of equalization insofar as it may ensure an equal access to the judicial protection 
of fundamental rights of everyone, and specially of the weak. Second: such a 
protection should be effective and not only symbolically affirmed. This requires 
an analysis that cannot be properly made here, but a reference to one specific 
aspect of the problem may give an idea of the dimension of the issue. 
Considering the frequency and the disastrous effects of “global torts” deriving 
for instance from pollution, sale of dangerous products, and so forth, the 
moment has come to think in terms of supra-national devices for the 
protection of collective interests. A sort of transnational class action could be 
                                                 
6 Vid. mainly GALANTER, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 
in 9 Law & Soc.Rev, 1974, pag. 1. 
7 Vid. FERRAJOLI, Principia iuris. Teoria del diritto e della democrazia. 1. Teoria del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 
2007, pags. 675  ss.  
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useful as an effective means for the equal protection of rights in a global 
dimension8.   
 
4. Devices of globalization 
The preceding remarks lead to a further question concerning the ways in 
which procedural justice could possibly be globalized. 
An almost immediate answer to this question is that the solution should be 
found by looking at the set of devices known as “informal justice” or ADR9. 
But such an answer needs to be carefully considered, mainly because a clear 
distinction has to be made between mediation and arbitration due to the 
structural and functional differences existing between the two types of dispute 
resolution devices. There is no need to insist here about such a distinction, but 
different remarks are worthy about mediation and arbitration in the perspective 
of the globalization of civil justice. 
     
4.1. About mediation 
Reaching the settlement of the conflicting interests of the parties may be an 
acceptable means to solve a dispute, and this is the reason why most lawgivers 
try to persuade (or even to compel) the parties to settle their dispute, with the 
clear aim of reducing the workload of courts. It seems clear, however, that 
mediation cannot be taken as the unique and ideal device for the resolution of 
all disputes, for at least three reasons (but many other reasons could be referred 
to). 
First: reaching a compromise between conflicting interests is not the same 
as doing justice by establishing rights and obligations. Therefore, mediation is 
not a real functional equivalent of jurisdiction. At most, it could be a second-
best (or even a third-best) solution of the problem. Thus it cannot be said in 
general terms that some forms of mediation could be the main road to the 
globalization of procedural justice.   
Second: mediation may be accepted mainly when the matter at stake is 
money, since an agreement can always be achieved about a fair compensation, 
but it may not be acceptable when the matter at stake is a right without any 
monetary value (or that cannot be completely transformed into a right to 
compensatory damages in case of violation). This is particularly clear in the area 
of fundamental rights. For instance: could my right of freedom be “mediated” 
                                                 
8 Vid. e.g. the essays collected in The Globalization of Class Actions, ed. by HENSLER, HODGES and 
TULIBACKA, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2009. 
9 About the role of such devices in the globalized world, still useful is the article by GLENN, 
Globalization and Dispute Resolution, 136, CJQ, 2000, pag. 137. 
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with the result that I sell myself as a slave for a fair sum of money? Is it more 
acceptable if a new form of slavery is created just because a good mediation 
could be used to fix the market price of liberty? Or could I give up my right to 
my physical personal integrity provided a mediator establishes the current 
market value of my organs? 
Third: last but not least it is worth stressing that mediation is structurally 
unable to compensate the differences between a strong party and a weak party. 
The mediator has to be neutral and impartial, although his task is to help the 
parties to reach an agreement, but he is not there to ensure the equity of the 
agreement. Therefore, when the differences between the parties are particularly 
strong—as happens in many globalized areas—it seems clear that the weak 
party will “voluntarily agree” with the solution determined and imposed by the 
other party10. In this sense, globalizing mediation may result in the globalization 
of injustice and inequality.  
 
4.2. About arbitration 
It is well known that in the last decades arbitration has been, and at present 
continues to be, the most important—and virtually the only—means to solve 
disputes concerning international commercial transactions. In a sense, lex 
mercatoria has become a synonym for international commercial arbitration. No 
wonder about that: the advantages of arbitration (such as speed, control of the 
parties, privacy, choice of the arbitrators, and so forth) largely exceed its 
disadvantages (costs and complexity), and this is particularly clear when two 
parties—possibly of the same strength and with converging interests—are 
making up an international commercial transaction. Moreover, although 
international commerce is by far the most important area of economic 
globalization, one may even think of a broader use of arbitration well beyond 
the application of lex mercatoria. For instance, a very interesting suggestion refers 
to the possibility of a “class action international arbitration”11. 
Although the clear success of arbitration in a broad area of transnational 
disputes shows that it may be the best method to solve many such disputes, it 
does not prove that arbitration is always the ideal device to be used in every 
kind of litigation. On the one hand, arbitration is the best solution when 
jurisdiction is not available or when going to a court would be exceedingly 
complex, but this is not enough to claim that arbitration is a priori the best 
                                                 
10 On such topics the fundamental reference is the article by OWEN FISS, Against Settlement, 
recently reproduced in FISS, The Law as It Could Be, New York U. Press, New York-London, 
2003, pag. 90. 
11 Vid. STRONG, From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Arbitration, in 26 Arb.Int. 
2010,  pag. 493; Id., Class Arbitration Outside the United States: Reading the Tea Leaves, in Dossier VII: 
Arbitration and Multiparty Contracts, ICC, Paris, 2010, pag. 183.  
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alternative. All things considered, arbitration requires an agreement of the 
parties to withdraw from jurisdiction, and then to give up the fundamental 
guarantees of procedural justice: but nothing proves that this is always a 
positive choice. On the other hand, a necessary condition of arbitration is the 
capacity of the parties to dispose of the substantive subject matter at stake, but 
such a condition in many cases does not exist. Once again, the puzzling issue is 
the implementation of fundamental rights: usually they are considered as absolute 
rights just to stress that they cannot be given up or disposed of by a mere act of 
will or by an agreement with the adverse party. Therefore, it is difficult to 
imagine an arbitration agreement concerning the implementation and the 
protection of a fundamental right. For similar reasons Ferrajoli claims, as 
abovesaid12, that jurisdiction is the essential guarantee of fundamental rights. 
Moreover, there are some matters in which the use of arbitration may raise 
relevant objections. For instance, one might wonder whether in labor relation-
ships the employer (i.e. the strong party) may impose on the employee (i.e. the 
weak party) an arbitration clause with which such a party gives up her right to 
the judicial protection of her legal position. Or one may wonder whether 
arbitration could be a viable and fair solution in a case of pollution of the air or 
of the sea, where the need is not only to compensate damages but also—or 
mainly—to impose in a public and global dimension compliance with general 
standards of environmental protection. 
 
5. Which globalization of procedural justice? 
Coming back—finally—to jurisdiction, the main issue is to imagine how a 
globalization of procedural justice could be achieved. Such an issue may have 
several solutions, and we may take into account at least the three most 
significant ones. 
 
5.1. Unification of procedural systems 
At first sight, a suggestion may be to unify all the national procedural 
systems: if all the countries had the same procedural regulations, globalizing the 
administration of civil justice would be virtually in re ipsa. Unfortunately, such a 
solution sounds practically impossible, but even if it were practically possible 
there would be good reasons not to adopt it. The impossibility is clear if we 
consider that a single and unique code of civil procedure to be enacted in all the 
countries of the world is just an abstract product of the imagination lacking any 
reasonable connection with any predictable future. 
                                                 
12 Vid. supra, fn. 7. 
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On the other hand, even within the limited range of the European Union 
of the Nineties the project of unifying at least some relevant aspects of civil 
procedure was theoretically very interesting but was not successful13.  
At any rate, a unification of civil procedure at a global level would be 
unacceptable for various cultural reasons. A procedural code is not just a set of 
rules of thumb that could be applied everywhere all around the world with just 
a few technical adaptations. The systems of justice are the historical outcomes 
of complex evolutions involving different social, ethical, economic and even 
religious factors and values. Such systems may evolve and change and they may 
be adapted—to some extent—to new needs and new situations, but they 
cannot—and should not—be set aside just in order to enact a completely new 
and uniform system of justice falling down—so to say—from heaven.     
Such remarks are meaningful not only when a unification of procedural 
systems is imagined at an abstract level of thinking, but also when the practical 
issue is whether or not to apply in other contexts an already existing system of 
justice. Actually the real problem is whether or not the American system of civil 
procedure should be adopted in other countries and possibly all around the 
world. Many Americans are so deeply persuaded that their system of litigation is 
“exceptional” (in the sense of: the best of all), that they could wish to benefit 
the rest of the world by exporting such a system everywhere14. However, such a 
perspective may raise some doubts. First of all, if anything is really exceptional 
it may be difficult or even impossible to export it elsewhere: the American 
procedural system is becoming more and more exceptional or even unique 
(mainly after the English reforms of the last years), but this is going to be an 
obstacle to a possible globalization of such a system by means of its application 
in quite different social, political and ethical contexts. So to say: the more 
exceptional, the less global. 
On the other hand, it may be difficult to accept, outside of the US, that the 
American procedural exceptionalism be converted into a sort of American 
procedural imperialism (as has already happened in some Latin American 
countries, where the American system of criminal procedure was adopted 
under the threat of not obtaining funds from the World Bank or from the 
International Monetary Fund). Moreover, being clear that the American system 
of civil litigation is largely inefficient and continues to be accepted only in the 
                                                 
13 Vid.  Rapprochement du droit judiciaire de l’Union européenne – Approximation of judiciary law in the 
European Union, ed. by STORME, Dordrecht, 1994. 
14 About American exceptionalism in the field of civil procedure vid. e.g. MARCUS, Exceptionalism 
and Convergence: Form versus Content and Categorical Views of Procedure, in 49 Sup.Ct.L.Rev, 2010, pag. 
521; CHASE, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, in 50 Am.J.Comp.L. 2002, pag. 
277; Id., Law, Culture, and Ritual. Disputing Systems in Cross-Cultural Context, New York U. Press, 
New York-London, 2005, pag.  47. 
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very peculiar social and ethical context of the US15, it is difficult to understand 
by which reasons all the other countries of the world should adopt such a 
system. So to say, people may well accept the Coca-Colaization of soft drinks 
and kids may appreciate the McDonaldsization of fast food, but the adminis-
tration of justice at a global level is something different. 
Nevertheless, while it seems very difficult to imagine or to accept the idea 
of a complete unification of procedural regulations, several partial unifications 
are possible and useful in the domain of international judicial assistance. As the 
European example clearly shows, uniform rules concerning for instance the 
choice of jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
and awards, the circulation of evidence and monetary injunctions, are important 
for the efficiency of transnational litigation. A broad unification of rules like 
these could provide partial but valuable solutions to several problems provoked 
by globalization. 
 
5.2. Regional models 
One of the reactions that may be provoked by globalization in the domain 
of civil justice is the trend to figure out regional models of civil proceedings and 
to use them either directly as a basis for reforms concerning domestic procedu-
ral codes, or as “model laws” representing a common frame of reference for 
procedural reforms in a specific area of the world. A well-known and important 
example of this trend is the Codigo Modelo for Latin America16 that was directly 
enacted in Uruguay but still is referred to as a model when the system of civil 
justice is reformed in other countries of the continent. 
The experience of drafting regional models for civil litigation is extremely 
interesting from many points of view but can hardly be considered as a viable 
solution for the globalization of civil justice. On the one hand, in point of fact 
the Latin American experience has not been completely successful, at least so 
far, but above all it is still unique. As abovesaid, the attempt to unify at least 
some parts of civil proceedings failed in Europe, but it is also very difficult to 
imagine a common European model of procedure, if one considers that 
historically, and at present as well, in Europe there are at least four important 
procedural models: the German–Austrian one, with all its variations in 
Scandinavian and East European countries; the French one, with its variations 
in Italy and in Belgium; the Spanish one and—last but not least—the English 
one. In such a fragmented and diversified situation a common “model code” of 
civil procedure is clearly beyond reach. 
                                                 
15 Vid. KAGAN, Adversarial Legalism. The American Way of Law, Harvard U. Press, Cambridge, 
Mass.-London, 2001, pags. 99, 229. 
16 Vid. El código procesal civil modelo para Iberoamérica, Montevideo, 1988. 
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On the other hand, in many important “regions” of the world there are 
simply no model codes for civil litigation, and it is hardly predictable whether 
or not they will be drafted in the future. Could we realistically imagine an 
Islamic model code of civil procedure, an African model code or even an Asian 
model code made applicable in China, Japan, Korea and Singapore? Maybe, but 
all this needs to be verified in the future. 
At any rate, even imagining that the worldwide map of procedural systems 
were “covered” by a horizontal set of regional procedural codes, such codes 
would probably be very different from each other. Then the variety of local 
procedural systems would be reduced to some extent, but there would be no 
real globalization of procedural justice. In this direction a more positive 
perspective could emerge if the various regional models were converging on a 
common set of principles or rules. This could be an intermediate step in the 
direction of a global harmonization of procedural systems. 
 
5.3. Harmonization.  
If a complete unification of procedural regulations is impossible and unde-
sirable, and that of regional models seems to be in itself—at least so far—an 
uncertain perspective, a possible solution to the problem of globalization could 
consist in the harmonization of procedural systems. Actually one may reasonably 
believe that the differences existing among the various national systems of civil 
procedure, and even within some national systems, are too many and too deep, 
and that significant advantages could derive from a substantial reduction of these 
differences. If the European and the extra-European landscapes of procedures 
were to some extent simplified and clarified —one might say— judicial resolution 
of transnational disputes would become easier, less complicated, less expensive 
and more efficient. Such remarks are very obvious and may be shared by anyone 
involved in the administration of civil justice. However, after having said that a 
fair degree of harmonization among the national systems of civil procedure 
would be desirable, the problem arises of determining “which” harmonization, 
and “of what”, could and should possibly be implemented. 
Harmonization is clearly a matter of degrees. Moreover, since we are 
thinking of extremely complex sets of rules, and the idea of unification is 
rejected, the other side of the coin is to decide which rules, or which procedural 
devices, should be harmonized. Finally, a further problem would concern the 
technique that should be used to implement such a harmonization. 
Thinking of a possible harmonization of the current procedural systems in 
terms of degrees, the two extremes of the scale could be set aside. The top 
extreme includes a narrow set of extremely general principles, such as: indepen-
dence of the judiciary, fair trial, right to be heard, reasonable delay, effective 
protection of rights. Such principles are very important, but they have become 
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so obvious and so “commonsense” that they should be assumed as valid in 
each modern system of civil litigation. They may not be effectively implemen-
ted —and actually they are not— in every procedural system all around the 
world, but they are recognized without difficulty in any system of procedure. 
They are also expressly stated by several national constitutions and in article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights as well as in other international 
conventions. It does not mean that these principles are stated and interpreted in 
the same ways in every country, and some uncertainties may arise about which 
principles should be included and which may not be included in this short list. 
However, roughly speaking it may be said that there is a general agreement 
about a group of principles concerning the fundamental guarantees of the 
administration of justice in civil matters17. At this level of generality, therefore, 
there is no problem for a future harmonization: to a large extent, actually, such 
principles are already harmonized. Therefore it may be said that a “substantial” 
convergence, if not a complete harmonization, already exists at the level of the 
fundamental guarantees of civil litigation.    
At the bottom level of procedural regulations there is a broad and chaotic 
array of very specific and detailed rules concerning a number of procedural 
devices and regulating the peculiar features of the judicial practice in each 
national system. It is well known that all the procedural codes include several 
hundreds of rules, many of which have some subsections. Moreover, a huge 
number of technical adjective norms is necessary for the functioning of the 
procedural machinery. Perhaps the harmonization of some of these rules (for 
instance: how to direct the notice of a complaint) may be useful, but when we 
think of harmonizing procedural systems we cannot realistically believe that it 
should concern all the hundreds of rules regulating the proceedings in all the 
jurisdictions involved. In other terms: at this level the problem of harmoniza-
tion cannot be stated at a general level, although harmonizing “some” technical 
mechanisms could be useful.    
Between the top level and the bottom level of procedural regulations there 
is a broad intermediate area in which several degrees can be distinguished by 
taking into consideration differences and similarities concerning the subject 
matter, the importance, the form and the structure of procedural provisions. 
Somewhere in this area there is a level at which a possible and fruitful 
harmonization might be achieved: actually one might think of a set of principles 
and rules conceived with the aim of representing a reference point for different 
and perhaps more specific particular regulations. It is the level where the so-
called Model Laws, as for instance those drafted by UNCITRAL, can be placed. It 
is also the level to which sets of procedural rules actually in force, such as the 
                                                 
17 Significant steps in this direction were already made in the Würzburg congress of the 
Association. Vid. Effektiver Rechtsschutz und verfassungsmässige Ordnung – Effectiveness of Judicial 
Protection and Constitutional Order, Würzburg, 1983. 
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American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence, may 
belong. These sets of rules are specific enough not to be confused with abstract 
principles, but general enough not to include excessively detailed regulations of 
procedural devices. This is just the level at which a substantial harmonization of 
procedural regulations may be imagined.   
If a personal reference is allowed, I would say that an interesting example 
of procedural harmonization at the intermediate level just defined is the set of 
principles and rules that were drafted and recently published by the American 
Law Institute and by UNIDROIT18. This text includes 31 Principles and 36 Rules, 
each Principle and each Rule being composed of several subsections. The 
Principles are stated in rather general terms and cover a long and detailed list of 
procedural problems such as jurisdiction, procedural equality of the parties, due 
notice, provisional and protective measures, structure of the proceeding, 
obligations of parties and lawyers, direction of the proceeding, evidence, 
presentation of evidence, roles of the parties and of the court, decision, 
settlement, enforcement, appeals and recognition of judgments.  
The Rules are somewhat more specific and detailed, although they are also 
stated in rather general terms, and provide an example of how the Principles 
could be implemented. The Rules deal with various topics including jurisdic-
tion, joinder and venue, composition of the court, contents of the pleadings, 
role and powers of the court, law of evidence and disclosure and presentation 
of evidence, final hearing and decision-making, appeals and enforcement of 
judgments. If taken together19, the Principles and Rules represent a consistent 
set of provisions that are much less general than abstract principles and much 
less detailed than a procedural code: however, they cover a broad number of 
procedural topics and for each of these topics they provide a model of 
regulation.  
It has to be underlined that the Principles and the Rules were not initially 
conceived and were not proposed as a model for the procedural regulation of 
domestic disputes. Actually, their declared purpose was at the same time narrow 
and immodest: the inspiring idea was of drafting a set of procedural rules that 
could be applied by any national courts in any country of the world while trying 
and deciding transnational commercial disputes20. As a rule, as is well known, 
domestic procedures are applied by national courts also when they deal with 
                                                 
18 Vid. ALI/UNIDROIT, Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, supra, fn. 2. 
19 The project initially sponsored by the American Law Institute was aimed at drafting a group of 
Rules, with Geoffrey C. Hazard and Michele Taruffo serving as co-reporters. When UNIDROIT 
joined the project it was shifted to a drafting of Principles, which finally were approved by both 
the sponsoring institutions. The Rules are then—so to say—a work product that may be referred 
only to the American Law Institute. However, the two texts are the outcomes of the same project 
and may be read as a homogeneous system of provisions.  
20 Vid. HAZARD, A Drafter’s Reflections on the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, in 
ALI/UNIDROIT, Principles, supra n.3., at xlvii. 
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such disputes, and this is exactly the point that triggered the beginning of the 
ALI/UNIDROIT project: the variety of domestic procedures applied by national 
courts to transnational commercial disputes is provoking an incredible amount 
of problems due to the practical impossibility of controlling proceedings 
occurring everywhere, and under different procedural systems, in the world of 
the globalized economy. Ideally, then, the Principles and Rules could be applied 
by any national court all around the world when a transnational commercial dispute 
has to be decided. To the extent that it may happen, the proceedings and the 
decisions concerning transnational commercial disputes could follow the same 
procedural pattern, on the basis of the application of the same standards. Of 
course the Principle and Rules should be connected and combined with the 
existing domestic procedures, since such procedures should remain applicable 
to all the subject matters not directly regulated by the Principles and Rules. 
However, they could create an interesting degree of uniformity in the 
proceedings concerning transnational disputes, since they could be able to 
overcome, at least to some extent, the diversity of national procedures. In such 
a sense, the adoption of the Principles and Rules (by means of international 
conventions or by adoption by national lawgivers) could be a powerful factor of 
harmonization in the treatment of transnational disputes by different national 
jurisdictions, and therefore could be an efficient method to globalize procedural 
justice. 
Although the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles and Rules were drafted with specific 
and explicit reference to transnational commercial disputes, it seems clear that 
they might be read and used also beyond the original intent of their drafters. 
Actually, just by setting aside a few provisions concerning specifically commercial 
disputes, most of the Principles and Rules may be read as a sort of Model Law, i.e. 
as a set of rules that could also be used as a frame of reference for procedural 
provisions concerning any kind of civil dispute. Provisions concerning pleadings, 
provisional measures, settlements, presentation of evidence, role of the court in 
managing the proceeding, form and contents of judgments, appeals, enforce-
ment, and so forth, could be easily taken as “models” for regulations concerning 
several relevant aspects of civil litigation. Of course each national lawgiver could 
conceive more specific and detailed regulations of these topics, but different 
regulations could be “harmonized” just by the fact of being partially different 
variations based upon the same Leitmotiv. 
This sort of harmonization could be a fair and efficient way to globalize 
procedural justice without meeting with the inconveniences that seem to be 
inherent in the other methods of globalization. 
    
